

English Summary

1. Introduction

This book is about corporate involvement in international crimes. In this criminological study, I investigate three different contexts: Nazi Germany (1933-1945), Apartheid South Africa (1948-1994) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; 1996-2016). For each of these contexts, I examine the dynamics between businesses and perpetrators of international crimes and developments over time. Within each context, I analyze one corporation in more detail by providing a case study of that corporation's involvement in international crimes. I do this to answer the research question of this study: *How have corporations become involved in international crimes and how could their involvement be explained and understood?*

As an empirical, descriptive and explorative investigation, this study adds to criminological research on (gross) human rights violations, international crimes and atrocity crimes, to research on corporate crime and to the field of 'business and human rights'.

Corporations are defined as organizations that meet the legal requirements of an entity separate from its owners and shareholders. In this study, I am interested in the involvement of private for-profit corporations that, as their core business, engage in legal and legitimate corporate activity. International crimes are defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and can be committed by states and by non-state actors. To demarcate 'involvement', instead of using existing legal classifications that focus primarily on accountability, I propose a broader criminological definition: a corporation is involved in international crimes when there is a link between a corporation's conduct and the commission of international crimes. In which way(s) a corporation is involved in international crimes is part of the analyses.

As a 'how' and a 'why' study of corporate involvement in international crimes, the present inquiry is undertaken using the method of the case study. Lacking the possibility to use a method of least difference and studying only a small number of cases the case study method precludes strong causal inferences. The conclusions, therefore, cannot be generalized to other cases of corporate involvement in international crimes: they are only generalizable to theoretical propositions. The sources used for this study include historical monographs on context and economic history, business history monographs, general academic literature, archival sources, court/TRC transcripts, NGO/activists research, openly available on-line information (newspaper articles, journalistic publications, blogs etc.) and openly available business communications.

Chapter 2: Theoretical model

To build a theoretical model to understand and explain corporate involvement in international crimes, I relied on research on state crime, corporate crime and state-corporate crime. State crime research enables a theoretical understanding of the roles of states in international crimes and the environments in which genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are committed. The field of corporate crime is relevant because corporate involvement in international crime is a corporate activity and, more specifically, corporate wrongdoing. Research on state-corporate crime is relevant because corporate involvement in international crimes is often the outcome of some form of cooperation between state actors and corporations.

Most extensively, I drew on the integrated framework to explain white-collar crime developed by Coleman (1987; 1995). His theory is based on the common-sense idea that for a crime to occur, some kind of motivation and opportunity must come together, with weak or absent control. I operationalized Coleman's three explanatory variables (motivation, opportunity and control) on the level of the corporation.

Motivation

The motivation of a corporation is directed at the corporation's goals, which are shared and reproduced in the corporation's culture. Corporate culture also holds ideas about the appropriate and desirable ways to achieve corporate goals. Most corporate goals are related to profit maximization and loss minimization. The social and political context in which international crimes take place may influence corporate goals. For example, corporations can cooperate with perpetrators of international crimes because of mutual interests and benefits that arise from a context of state oppression, war or armed conflict. But the context of international crimes can also invoke corporate goals that are less directly related to profit. Corporations may be coerced into cooperation by perpetrators of international crimes or owners may put their corporations in service of the perpetrators of international crimes because of (shared) ideological reasons.

In corporate crime research, corporate culture is often used to conceptualize the effect of the organizational culture on individual behaviour. In this research, I will use corporate culture as a characteristic of the corporation. More specifically, a corporate culture, reflected by corporate narrative, can give insights into why corporations were willing to take the risk of becoming involved in international crimes.

When corporate activity is in conflict with moral notions about right and wrong, general social norms or official regulations, corporate culture (re)produces neutralization techniques which are sometimes, though not always, expressed through corporate narratives. Huisman (2010) found various neutralization techniques were used by corporations that had been accused of involvement in international crimes, such as 1) denying of harm (claiming there was no crime committed); 2) denying involvement (claiming there is no link between the corporation and the commission of international crimes); 3) claiming the necessity of obeying local governments' law and policies; 4) putting emphasis on positive effects (for example claiming that, on balance the business activities are beneficial) or, similarly; 5) appealing to higher loyalties such as the safety of personnel; 6) claiming that the corporation is a victim too; 7) claiming the accusations are unfair because 'everyone does it' and, finally; 8) condemning the condemners by questioning or otherwise delegitimizing their accusations.

Opportunity

Motivation needs to coincide with opportunity to corporate involvement in international crimes. On the one hand opportunity refers to the opportunity structure that enables and constrains the possible courses of corporate action, some of which may result in involvement in international crimes. On the other hand, opportunity refers to the corporation's capabilities to make use of the opportunity structure in the context in which it operates and thereby mitigates or exacerbates its risk to become involved in international crimes.

A corporation's opportunity structure is determined by the political economy in which it operates, globally and locally. In addition to the economic and market circumstances, a political economy

consists of the policies of (the) state(s) in which corporations operate. When corporations operate in contexts where international crimes are committed, the economic and market circumstances become characterized by oppression, war and/or conflict. In strong states that commit international crimes, market mechanisms tend to be restricted by rigid policies. In this context, opportunities for corporations may be restricted, but the goal of self-sufficiency may also create new opportunities such as lucrative government contracts. In weak states where international crimes are committed, market forces are typically unrestricted by state policies. Both strong and weak states can have war- and conflict economies, which tend to be extremely volatile and thus create a risky opportunity structure for corporations.

Policies of states can go beyond restricting economic and market forces: they can be directed at bringing corporate activity in line with political, social and/or military goals of the states. The capacity of strong states to successfully carry out government policies enables them to provide strong incentives for state-corporate cooperation. States can incentivise corporations to cooperate towards their goals by presenting 'carrots' as rewards and 'sticks' as punishment. The capacity of weak states tends to be limited to presenting 'carrots'.

A corporation's ability to make use of global and national opportunity structures depends its characteristics. To understand corporate involvement in international crimes, three aspects are particularly important. First, corporate involvement in international crimes is related to a corporation's ability to fulfil demand for certain goods and services. Second, corporate involvement is related to the corporation's ability to find and follow an alternative course of action that would end or prevent involvement in international crimes. This ability is determined by the corporation's room for manoeuvre. This room will depend on the power of the company in relation to the perpetrators of international crimes and be limited by the extent to which the company is economically dependent on corporate activities that may result in involvement international crimes.

A third corporate ability important to understand involvement in international crimes, (continued) involvement is related to a corporation's ability to prevent or withstand any negative effects of official or public condemnation of their business activities. Corporations can develop strategies to deal with such official or civil society condemnation. First, corporations can conceal their involvement, by keeping their business activities secret. Second, corporations can create corporate narratives in which it makes use of neutralization techniques to counter the claim that their corporate activity is unacceptable.

Control

Both motivation and opportunity are subject to various forms of control. Control has the potential to prevent, change or stop corporate activity that leads to corporate involvement in international crimes or to create accountability for this involvement. I look at formal, semi-formal and informal control.

Formal control consists of formal regulation, such as legal codes and administrative measures of specific domestic or international jurisdictions. Formal control can be enforced by procedures such as criminal investigations and trials, civil lawsuits or invoking designated formal complaint procedures. When corporations become involved in international crimes, the state is often unwilling and/or unable to enforce formal control to prevent or end corporate involvement in international crimes. When a state itself commits international crimes, it will be unwilling to exercise formal control. State-corporate cooperation, in particular, protects a corporation against formal control by a state. When

international crimes are committed by non-state actors, the state is unable to prevent the commission those international crimes and will, most likely, also be unable to regulate corporations that become involved in international crimes.

In the case of corporate involvement in international crimes, often, though not always, more than one domestic jurisdiction is relevant. Multinationals operate in multiple countries: the countries in which a corporation carries out its operations (the host states), and the country where a company is headquartered (the home state). In practice, however, home states are generally reluctant to exercise extraterritorial control over the foreign activities of their corporate nationals. What results is a 'governance gap' and a general expectation that formal regulation of corporate involvement in international crimes is generally non-existent, weak, and/or ineffective.

In addition to national formal regulation, there is also an international level of formal governance. Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations and the European Union have the ability to call out sanctions and embargoes that can affect corporate activity. Yet, given the way these international and supranational bodies are organized, enforcement of formal regulation announced on these levels is likely to depend on enforcement by individual states. Finally, when oppression or conflict ends, instruments of transitional justice may address the roles of corporations, in an effort to hold corporations accountable for their involvement in international crimes. This type of control potentially prevent, change or stop corporate activity that leads to involvement in international crimes in future cases.

Besides internationally formulated formal sanctions and embargoes, which can have a binding character, IGOs have developed several non-binding guidelines aimed at preventing or ending corporate involvement in international crimes through their focus on corporate human rights violations. These guidelines are often called 'soft-law' because they are non-binding but codified norms, explicitly adopted by IGOs, states, corporations and NGOs. When soft-law instruments are employed by formal authorities such as the United Nations or government agencies, they function as semi-formal control.

Informal control consists of pressures aimed to prevent or end corporate involvement in international crimes by 1) civil society, represented by NGOs, scholars, and activists; 2) journalists and media outlets and; 3) by the business sector itself. Civil society and the media can exercise pressure in three ways. First NGOs, scholars, activists and journalists can engage in research that may unveil corporate involvement in international crimes. Second, NGOs and the media can create publicity for these accusations. Together with activists, NGOs may engage in public advocacy and start a campaign to encourage a consumer boycott of a particular company that is involved in international crimes. Third, NGOs can assist in the creation of 'soft law' and lobby with authorities to install laws and policies. The business sector also produces its own informal control. Some corporations have drafted corporate codes that take into account the risk of becoming involved in international crimes, and enforce these corporate codes internally.

Part I: Nazi Germany

Chapter 3: Corporate involvement in the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes

In chapter 3, I described how corporations were involved in the Holocaust and other crimes of the Nazi regime. I started by showing how the Nazi regime, soon after they came to power, took strong control over German business, while corporations were still recovering from the Great Depression of the 1930s. Then, I first described how banks and insurance companies were involved in the social and economic persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany and, later, in the occupied territories. They facilitated the aryanization of Jewish-owned property and, in a broader sense, carried out state policies aimed at the social and economic marginalisation of the targeted groups. Second, I showed how corporations carried out medical experiments and provided Zyklon B used for mass murder and genocide in the concentration and extermination camps. The Nazi concentration camp system presented these corporations with hitherto unavailable business opportunities. Finally, this chapter showed how corporations helped sustain the regime by using slave labour, thereby contributing to the German warfare and extending the time frame in which the Nazi regime was able to commit its crimes. For many corporations, using slave labour became a necessity to survive, given the context of totalitarianism, oppression and war in which they operated. Finally, I showed how corporate involvement in international crimes was dealt with after the end of the Second World War.

The ways in which corporations were involved in the Holocaust and other crimes by the Nazi regimes show how interrelated the state and corporations were in Nazi Germany: the state needed corporations to commit their crimes and corporations cooperated with the state in many central aspects of the Holocaust. This state-corporate interrelatedness was the result of the government's extensive control over the business sector. This control enabled the Nazi regime to effectively incentivise corporations to work toward the regime's economic, military and genocidal goals. Mostly, these incentives existed of presenting corporate as mutually beneficial to both the state and business. Although corporations sought to profit from this context, the promise of profitability made by the Nazi regime generally proved to be empty.

Nevertheless, the Nazi regime was able to make use competition between firms in order to have corporations work towards state goals. Both corporate involvement in the aryanization of Jewish property and the use of slave labour was spurred by market competition between firms that had little alternative ways to make profits. In addition, the Nazi regime provided other 'carrots' for those that worked towards the state's goals, such as the allocation of more raw materials or other resources to corporations that contributed to the war production. When the 'carrot' of mutual benefits proved to be an insufficient incentive, the regime did not eschew the use of coercion. The involvement of Allianz, in the aftermath of the Reichskristallnacht, for example, was, to a large extent, the result of coercion by the Nazi regime. The 'sticks' used by the Nazi regime included (the threat of) forced nationalisation for which the Hermann Goering Werke is an illustration, or, more commonly, (the threat of) withholding resources or government contracts.

Doing business in Nazi Germany was not only dependent on being profitable and surviving economically, but also on surviving politically or even militarily. Given Nazi Germany's totalitarian nature, corporations had to ensure the regime's political favour in order to be able to achieve their economic goals. The context of war gave further incentives to use slave labour, for example, even when this was not necessarily profitable. Corporations did not only use slave labour to remain competitive and keep production going: not using slave labour would invoke accusations of being

defeatist for failing to contribute to the military outcome of the war. The expected consequences of losing the war, after all, were severely damaging to corporate interests. This way, the necessity to survive politically was another incentive to cooperate with the regime.

Business historians, across the board, agree that most businessmen running Germany's largest corporations were not avid anti-Semites and did not actively subscribe to Nazi ideology. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that ideas originating from Nazi ideology, such as anti-Semitism and a general sense of German superiority, did have some impact on corporate conduct: Nazi ideology was omnipresent in Nazi Germany's society and also permeated corporate cultures. As opposed to SS-businesses, privately owned corporations were not driven by ideological motives: owners and managers did not fully put their businesses in service of ideological goals. However, an anti-Semitic and anti-Communist attitudinal climate may have contributed to the ease with which Jews were marginalized, victims were dehumanized and the commission of international crimes was justified. In other words, ideology may have impacted the evaluation of corporate activity that led to involvement in international crimes. Ideology provided ideas that could be used as neutralization techniques by those working on behalf of corporations. These neutralization techniques enabled them to see their activities as appropriate and desirable, even when they violated moral, social or legal norms. This could explain why German corporations, across all sectors, did not significantly oppose cooperation with the state towards the commission of international crimes.

Studies of banks, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies and other types of businesses that have become involved in international crimes have provided hints that, across all these sectors, individuals working on behalf of these corporations operated according to a narrowly perceived and selective professionalism. This professionalism was narrow because it was limited to the task or interest at hand and it was selective because it adhered to some norms but not others. This mode of professionalism was arguably inspired or exacerbated by the culture of technological modernism, influential within Nazi state institutions and shared within German business culture.

Technological modernism, with its emphasis on efficiency, improved design, engineering, standards, systems and performance, shaped both the way crimes by the Nazi regime were organized and the perceptions of those working on behalf of the corporations that became involved in those crimes. Regarding the former, the crimes by the Nazi regime were organized as division-of-labour crimes. Corporations were generally involved in only one or a few aspects of the Holocaust. This potentially reduced the moral burden for individuals working on behalf of these corporations. Regarding the latter, the perception of those working on behalf of these corporations was shaped by the emphasis on efficiency, improved design and other values represented by technological modernism. This enabled them, or even encouraged them, to keep moral considerations at bay.

The adoption of a narrow and selective conception of professionalism can thus be seen as a result of the division-of-labour character of the crime and a focus on efficiency, taken together. Although the precise norms and tasks differed between professions, a selective and narrow conception of professionalism is a consistent aspect of the involvement of banks, insurance companies and pharmaceutical, armament or chemical businesses.

Nazi ideology and the broadly shared idea of technological modernism may both have made available ideas that could function as neutralization techniques. As such, they can be viewed as sources of neutralization techniques. Both Nazi ideology and the idea of technological modernism were part of

societal and corporate culture and made available both a priori justifications as well as ex post facto excuses.

As a general pattern, corporations became involved in crimes by the Nazi regime because of their ability to fulfil the government's demands. Banks had the know-how to transfer assets, IG Farben could fulfil the need for synthetic rubber needed by the army and Tesch & Stabenau provided a product that could be used for mass murder, for example. This capacity to fulfil demand was thus the main determinant of how well a corporation could make use of the opportunity structure as shaped by the Nazi regime.

For corporations involved in crimes by the Nazi regime, there was no formal or informal control aimed at preventing or punishing that involvement. Formal control was directed at cooperation with the state, and thus cooperation in the commission of international crimes, which were central to the Nazi state's social, military and economic goals. As such, formal control was reversed, compared how it is traditionally seen. Instead of its traditional function as a regulator, exercising control, the state was a customer and beneficiary of corporate contributions to state activities, exercising reversed control. Informal control by civil society and the media was non-existent, given that Nazi Germany was a closed-off state with a censored press, in a world that would come to conceptualize international crimes only after the Second World War.

Chapter 4: The Oven Builders of the Holocaust: the case of Topf & Söhne

In chapter 4, I analysed how and why the German company Topf & Söhne (Topf) became involved in the genocide and crimes against humanity in the concentration- and extermination camps established by Nazi Germany. Topf was involved in these crimes by designing, manufacturing, delivering, installing, and servicing ovens that were used to incinerate the bodies of those who had died or had been killed.

Instead of profit, coercion or ideology, it seems that a culture of perfection and innovation lay at the root of the corporate goals that motivated Topf to design and provide ovens to the SS. Topf's corporate culture had adopted the values central to technological modernism and was emphasising efficiency and innovation. It was the emphasis on these values that drove the corporation's activity, through its engineers and employees, and to actively seek technical solutions to the 'problems' of the SS.

Technological innovation and perfection were not only a corporate goal, they also provided the framework in which those working on behalf of Topf saw their activities as appropriate and desirable. The emphasis on innovation and perfection in Topf's corporate culture allowed and encouraged the adoption of a narrow, selective professionalism, similar to other German corporations, as I have described in chapter 3. Topf's engineers adopted a narrow focus, limited to the task at hand (that is, solving the SS' problem of 'dealing with' mass murder and genocide). This conception of professionalism enabled Topf's engineers to substitute their moral responsibility with a *Moral der Effizienz*. As such, the values of technological modernism, via a narrow and selective conception of professionalism shared and reproduced in Topf's corporate culture, were a source of neutralization techniques.

Overall, the context of war had a negative effect on the opportunity structure in which Topf operated. For the oven department, however, the war offered new opportunities. Topf had the capability to fulfil

to this need by developing innovative incineration ovens for burning human remains. The company could do so because it had the necessary knowledge and skills to fulfil the regime's demands.

Formal control from the state was absent, or rather, reversed. The Nazi state was Topf's customer instead of its regulator. In addition, the Nazi state did not consider and sanction Topf's activities as (involvement in) crimes. As Topf's customer and as perpetrator of the international crimes Topf became involved in, the Nazi regime did not employ any conventional formal control over the company's deliveries of ovens. Formal control at the supranational level did not yet exist. And informal control by civil society, the media or the business sector did not function in Nazi Germany. Such forms of informal control of corporate involvement in international crimes would only develop some decades later.

Part II: Apartheid South Africa

Chapter 5: Corporate involvement in apartheid

In chapter 5, I have described how corporations became involved in the crime of apartheid carried out by the apartheid regime in South Africa between 1948 and 1994. I started by showing how the South African mining sector had laid the foundations for apartheid. Mining companies were thereby historically involved in the development of segregation and marginalization that became policies of the Apartheid regime. After 1948, they became involved in the crime of apartheid by applying apartheid policies. I argued that changes in economic circumstances made apartheid less economically beneficial, and that corporations reacted to this shift, focussing on how fear of an end of apartheid and a belief in 'peace through commerce' precluded strong opposition. Then, I showed how foreign automotive, armament and technology corporations delivered (parts of) vehicles, arms and technological solutions that were used to violently oppress opponents of apartheid. I explained how these corporations continued to supply South Africa in spite of an arms embargo and growing international condemnation of their business activities. Finally, I showed how oil companies and commercial financial institutions helped to sustain apartheid. This involvement received a lot of public condemnation and these corporations became a central target for anti-apartheid activism. Nevertheless, oil companies and banks only left South Africa when this became financially necessary. I ended the chapter with a description of how corporate involvement in the crime of apartheid was dealt with after apartheid had ended.

The ways corporations became involved in the crime of apartheid were characterised by a sense of normality and 'business as usual', at least until the anti-apartheid movement arose. The opportunity structure in Apartheid South Africa was, until the late 1970s, very profitable for corporations operating in all sectors. State-corporate cooperation under a system of apartheid was mutually beneficial as corporate goals and the goals of the apartheid regime were very compatible. Cheap labour was advantageous for labour-intensive businesses, such as mining corporations. In addition, South Africa's security and energy policies were geared towards self-sufficiency, a state policy profitable for both domestic and foreign companies.

In the late 1970s, the economic outlook changed. The stagnation of the South African economy was, for an important part, the result of the economic irrationality of apartheid policies. South Africa's economy increasingly depended on skilled labour which, reserved for white South-Africans only, was artificially kept expensive. At the same time, the spending power of the majority of South Africa's

population was kept low by the economic marginalization of all non-white South Africans. By its laws and policies, the apartheid state restricted South Africa's economy in important ways, for example by controlling labour allocation and imports.

Internationally operating businesses did business in South Africa through subsidiaries or through business relations, delivering goods and services from abroad. They provided products that were essential to the South African economy and society. More specifically, the automotive, armament and technology products as well as the oil and financial products provided by these foreign companies were essential for South Africa's violent oppression and for sustaining the Apartheid regime.

Corporations involved through their deliveries of goods and services to South Africa needed the ability to circumvent the oil embargoes and arms embargo that the international community installed in the late 1970s and 1980s. Often they were able to work around these restrictions because of the dual-use character of their products: the products they delivered to South Africa could have civilian as well as police or military use. In addition, the products could have legitimate use for the police and military or be used for violent repression. The dual-use character of these products was important for how business in and with South Africa could be seen as appropriate and desirable by corporations, even in the context of extreme levels of violence by police and military forces. Automotive corporations, for example, emphasized how they contributed to the development of South Africa, by pointing to their production for civilians instead of their production for the police and military. Many corporations could claim that their products benefitted South Africans, including black South Africans.

The limited opposition from South African as well as internationally operating businesses suggests that corporations continued to see their activities as appropriate and desirable, even though these activities constituted involvement in apartheid. For domestic corporations, this view of events can, at least partly, have been the result of the omnipresence of apartheid ideology in Apartheid South Africa. Apartheid ideology, consisting of white supremacy, fears about 'black danger' and anti-communist ideas enabled the owners, board members and managers of South African corporations to see their part in the exploitation of black labour and other activity that contributed to the crime of apartheid as appropriate and desirable. What is more, they prevented corporate leaders from openly and strongly opposing apartheid. Ideas originating from apartheid ideology became part of the corporate cultures of South African corporations as most business leaders and managers had been subjected to apartheid propaganda in all aspects of their lives. As a result, corporate cultures reproduced ideas that solved potential conflicts between corporate activities and competing moral, social and legal norms.

Internationally operating businesses were less influenced by apartheid ideology, although the prominence of apartheid ideology depended on the number of South African employees and managers the corporation employed. The context of the Cold War, however, provided 'internationals' with similar ideas to neutralize their business activities. Black Africa (and Black South Africans) were often equated with communism and were therefore seen as enemies of the 'liberal West'. This was particularly influential for US, European and Israeli armament corporations that were heavily influenced by geopolitical relations in which South Africa was an important western ally against the communist eastern bloc.

In addition, domestic and foreign corporations were influenced a second set of beliefs. This was the belief that economic development and interrelatedness between countries would contribute to prosperity and, thereby to peace and democracy. Widely shared within the globalizing business

community and government circles, this set of ideas limited corporate opposition to the apartheid regime.

In the domestic version of this belief, often referred to as the Oppenheimer thesis, economic development would first alleviate the negative effects of apartheid and, over time, lead to an end to apartheid. Although the history of South Africa shows that the Oppenheimer thesis is false, this line of thinking persisted. It allowed those working on behalf of South African corporations to overcome persisting moral qualms and (anticipated) social or legal condemnation. Interestingly, the notions of apartheid policy are somewhat at odds with a belief in economic development ending apartheid: if one is afraid to lose the economic and political upper hand as a white business leader, one would not want one's business to contribute to the end of apartheid. Nevertheless, the separate notions of apartheid ideology and the Oppenheimer thesis could exist side by side. This was illustrated by the fact that when push came to shove, the business sector was reluctant to continue talks with the ANC because of that organization's perceived communist threat.

In the international version of the belief in economic development as a way to peace and democracy, corporations claimed in their corporate narratives that remaining active in South Africa would contribute to an end of apartheid while leaving would not. The beliefs underlying such 'constructive engagement' allowed corporate leaders and their employees to see their activities as appropriate and desirable despite the increasing social condemnation they were subject to. In other words, the notion that their company was 'doing good' by operating in South Africa, allowed owners, managers and employees to neutralize any moral qualms about their activities, internally. In addition to this ability to justify their activity, they also used this neutralization technique to excuse their activity, externally. In the next chapter I will explain, in more detail, how this worked out for Royal Dutch/Shell. From the 1980s, some internationally operating businesses openly denounced apartheid yet most remained active in South Africa, maintaining their assets and continuing their business activities until or beyond the mid-1980s. By then, the reduced economic outlook and the United States' Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act led to a wave of divestment from South Africa in 1985 and 1986, although many internationally operating businesses remained.

Apartheid ideology and the belief in 'peace through commerce' both functioned as sources of neutralization techniques: they produced ideas that could be used as neutralization techniques by those working on behalf of corporations involved in apartheid. The international condemnation of apartheid, over time, meant that such ideological ideas were hidden, externally. Therefore, neutralizations made available by apartheid ideology were not part of corporate narratives. The belief that economic development would end apartheid, in contrast, was used extensively in corporate narratives.

One important reason corporations became involved in the crime of apartheid was that they could fulfil the demands of the South African government. Mining companies had the knowhow and capital to develop a mineral industry in South Africa. Commercial and manufacturing corporations further developed the country's economy within the economic framework that had been built on marginalization and segregation. Automotive, armament and technology corporations could provide the police and armed forces with the equipment necessary to violently oppress black South Africans. Finally, oil and financial companies had the knowhow and infrastructure to provide the oil and finances.

The opportunity structure for domestic South African corporations differed from the opportunity structure in which internationally operating businesses operated. First, domestic corporations experienced fewer negative consequences from their involvement: although their economic prospects may have been hampered by the apartheid economy, they did not have a reputation to defend outside South Africa. Internationally operating corporations, in contrast, had to deal with public condemnation of their business activities or official regulation that was detrimental to business. These negative consequences, however, seem to differ per sector and per company: some sectors and companies are more susceptible to public condemnation.

A second way the opportunity structure was different for domestic corporations and internationally operating businesses was the ability of the latter to find and make use of alternative courses of action. Because doing business in South Africa automatically meant involvement in the crime of apartheid, the room for manoeuvre for domestic corporations was limited to the leeway corporations had in how strictly they adhered to apartheid policies and how vocally they opposed apartheid. Internationally operating corporations also had these options but could, in addition, choose to leave South Africa.

For corporations involved in the crime of apartheid, formal and informal control increased substantially over time. Domestic formal control, however, was fully geared towards ensuring cooperation towards the apartheid regime's goals, and thus in carrying out and sustaining the crime of apartheid. Formal control within South Africa was thus reversed, compared to how it is traditionally seen. Instead of preventing corporate involvement in international crimes, South Africa's legal and administrative regulations promoted such involvement.

Internationally operating corporations fell not only under South African jurisdiction, but also under the jurisdiction of their home state. It was in those countries that NGOs, journalists and academics exposed corporate involvement in the crime of apartheid as part of their anti-apartheid campaigns. By exercising such informal control, they were able to mobilize a substantial public condemnation of corporations that did business in or with South Africa. Their campaigning and lobbying led to the formal control that, over time, was put into place in Europe and the United States as well at the United Nations: (mandatory) arms embargo and (voluntary) oil embargo. The oil and arms embargo, however, were only partially implemented by Member States and the enforcement of the embargoes was limited. As a result, NGOs, journalists and academics continued their exposure of corporate involvement in the crime of apartheid and continued their campaigns.

For US corporations, their 'home jurisdiction' had a substantial impact on their business activities when Congress adopted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The CAAA made their business in and with South Africa much less lucrative, or in some cases, prohibited such business altogether. This led many US based businesses to leave South Africa. This confirms the general pattern that corporate involvement in the crime of apartheid only diminished as a result of declining profits and losses and not because of moral or political opposition. In addition, even when corporations outwardly opposed apartheid, they were only willing to create change after political leaders had taken charge. In the end, the iron wall between business and politics remained in place until, at the end of the Cold War, the iron curtain was removed and the perceived threat of communism subsided.

Chapter 6: Sticking to Apartheid: the case of Royal Dutch/Shell

In chapter 6, I focused on Royal Dutch/Shell (Shell). I identified three ways in which Shell, through its daughter company Shell SA, was involved in the crime of apartheid. First, Shell sustained apartheid

by delivering oil to South Africa. Second the company supplied the military and police forces with oil and other products. Third, Shell SA and its subsidiaries employed cheap black labour. These three ways of involvement were essentially a result of the continued presence of Shell in South Africa. In order to operate a business in South Africa, Shell had to deliver oil to South Africa, was legally required to supply the military and police forces with fuel and lubricants and employed black workers who were subjugated under apartheid labour laws. Acting in compliance with national laws and policies was essential to Shell's business practice, as Shell continued to emphasize. However, compliance with local laws and policies made involvement in the crime of apartheid, ultimately, inevitable.

Shell's presence in South Africa was heavily criticized by anti-apartheid activists who, in the 1980s, had set up a world-wide campaign against Shell. Nonetheless the company decided, repeatedly, to stay. This may have been motivated by profit. Although reliable figures are missing, there is ample evidence that Shell's oil deliveries and other business activities in South Africa were indeed profitable. However, given that Shell SA accounted for only 1 percent of the Shell Group's total revenue, it seems unlikely that profit was the only, or most important, motive to stay in South Africa. Instead, for the Shell Group, it was crucial not to create a precedent. The group operated in many countries around the world where it could also be criticized for supporting repressive regimes and supplying excessively violent military and police forces. As a global company, it felt it could not afford to give in to such political pressures by leaving.

Shell presented its corporate activity as appropriate and desirable by using a frame of 'constructive engagement' with the South African government. 'Constructive engagement', in its corporate form, consisted of Shell's Corporate Social Responsibility projects in South Africa and a corporate narrative that emphasized how Shell could only contribute to reforms if it were to stay in South Africa. This approach was based on the theory of commercial liberalism which held that economic development and economic interlinkages promote peace and democracy, as I have also described in chapter 5. Broadly shared in globalizing business circles, the belief in 'peace through commerce' was a source of neutralization techniques, shared and reproduced within Shell's corporate culture and the consistent narrative reaction to accusations of involvement in the crime of apartheid.

In South Africa, Shell operated within an opportunity structure shaped by the need for oil of the apartheid regime and its military and police forces. Its global infrastructure enabled Shell to deliver oil, even under the circumstances of an oil embargo. The opportunity to use cheap black labour was ensured by the apartheid economic system, laws and policies and related ideology of segregation by which black workers were structurally subjugated. Shell's knowledge, resources and skills enabled the company to successfully navigate the economic and political environment inside South Africa and, moreover, to deal with the formal and informal control outside South Africa.

Formal control existed in the form of an oil embargo, which came late, was not generally supported, and was weakly enforced. This embargo could therefore easily be circumvented by delivering oil from non-embargo territories. The Shipping Research Bureau functioned as a strong informal control because it exposed oil deliveries. These exposures invoked public condemnation of Shell's activities particularly because Shell claimed to have ceased oil deliveries. Yet from 1981 onwards, Shell successfully circumvented their scrutiny as well. In keeping its oil deliveries secret, Shell was assisted by South Africa's extensive secrecy legislation.

Nevertheless, the call for Shell to leave South Africa by the anti-apartheid movement only increased in the 1980s. Anti-Shell activism was a more powerful control than formal control, yet Shell was able to withstand these pressures and to keep the consequences of the campaigns relatively minor. Shell countered the anti-Shell narrative with its own narrative, emphasizing agreement on wanting apartheid to end, yet disagreeing on the method of how to create change. The Shell Group had the capacity and skills to convince the majority of its own employees and shareholders. Shell justified its decision to stay in South Africa by using these neutralization techniques originating the belief in peace through commerce, blaming South Africa for its apartheid, secrecy and oil policies and by appealing to the higher goal of ending the crime of apartheid.

We have seen that the Shell Group and Shell SA over time came to oppose the crime of apartheid, by playing a more positive role in transforming the system of apartheid. The analysis brought forward four reasons for this move: first, Shell needed to justify its continued presence to counter the public condemnation of its activities. Second, Shell sought to improve its reputation among Black South Africans. Third, it was a manifestation of Shell's belief, shared and reproduced in Shell and Shell SA's corporate cultures that its continued presence in South Africa could indeed contribute to an end of apartheid. Finally, Shell's outspoken criticism was a result of the changing economic and political conditions where business prospects were hampered by the increasingly violent repression policies during the states of emergency of 1985 and 1986.

Many claims by anti-apartheid and anti-Shell activists are morally compelling, but factually ambiguous. One of the reasons for this disparity is that causal connections between Shell's business practices and the racist and segregationist policies and laws of the apartheid regime are difficult to establish. Similarly, the relationship between Shell's business activities and the actions of the SADF and the SAP in the violent enforcement of apartheid policies and laws is causally distant. With its use of black labour Shell perhaps came closest to the suffering under apartheid, because this took place within Shell-owned mines, refineries and factories. Nevertheless, the deprived circumstances in which the black population worked can only be considered an international crime, and the crime of apartheid, when seen in the context of the structural subjugation of black workers and the oppression of black South Africans under apartheid in general. Apartheid and the resulting human suffering would not necessarily have ended, or ended sooner, if Shell had left the country and had terminated its oil deliveries, in contrast to many apartheid-activist claims. On the contrary, the effects of such a decision by Shell, might have been counterproductive as an economic collapse of the apartheid economy might have created even more human suffering.

Part III: The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Chapter 7: Corporate involvement in the DRC

In chapter 7, I have described how corporations have become involved in international crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or Congo) by rebel groups and the DRC army between 1996 and 2016. I started with a brief overview of the history of the DRC. Then, I first described the roles of business in the creation of the social, political and economic context in which international crimes were committed. I showed that, during the First Congo War (1996-1998), the Congolese artisanal mining sector became militarised while the rest of the supply chain of these minerals, on the whole, remained in place. Industrial mining corporations saw the change of power in the Congo as an opening for business. Their financial support helped Kabila to reach the country's capital. Second, I have looked at how and why corporations became involved in the commission of

international crimes, especially during the Second Congo War (1998-2003). Because the supply-side of artisanally mined minerals had become militarised, corporations that sourced from these supply chains became involved in crimes by rebel groups: they brought these minerals onto the international market, refined them and used them in their products. Thereby, they financed armed groups that committed international crimes. Corporate sourcing from the DRC continued and, during the 2000s, attracted attention by NGOs that sought to stop 'conflict minerals'. Meanwhile, industrial mining corporations that had started operations in the DRC became involved in violent attacks by the state military or rebel groups by providing financial and logistical support. Finally, I looked at corporate involvement in sustaining the conflict in the DRC. Efforts to break the link between 'conflict minerals' and conflict have proven difficult. Industrial resource extraction has ignited new conflict and Kabila's business networks have strengthened his power past his official term as president.

The ways corporations became involved in international crimes in the DRC were characterised by an absent, negligent and corrupt state with weak institutions. During the First Congo War the Mobutu state was overthrown by Kabila's AFDL. During the Second Congo War, Kabila's former Rwandan and Ugandan allies attacked the DRC in a war that was ended by peace agreement and a transitional government, also led by Kabila, which was installed in 2003. Throughout the Congo Wars and after 2002, the supply side of the artisanally mined resources supply chain in Eastern DRC came into the hands of Rwandan, Ugandan and local Congolese elites. Income from artisanally mined resources, at the supply-side of artisanally mined minerals, was used to wage war, during which international crimes were committed. Nevertheless, the intermediary part of the supply chain (made up of refineries and manufacturers) and the demand side of the supply chain (made up of end-user companies such as telecommunication businesses and retailers) remained largely intact. Even though the conflict had significantly impacted the political, economic and social context in the DRC, it did not affect the global supply chain and, by extension, did not affect their global opportunity structure.

Refineries and manufacturers that operated in the intermediary part of the supply chain of both artisanally and industrially mined mineral resources became involved in the commission of international crimes not because of their direct business activity but through their supply chain only. These corporations largely continued their regular procedures to obtain mineral resources. Their corporate activity was also 'business as usual' even though their purchases no longer benefitted civilians but only the business elites that had become closely affiliated with the military and political elites present in Eastern DRC.

End-use corporations such as telecommunication companies and retailers operating on the demand side of mineral resources similarly became involved in crimes in the DRC through their supply chain. Mineral resources, supplied and exported from conflict areas in the DRC, for example, were used in technological devices, some of them for the global consumer market. These corporations too largely continued their regular business activities sourcing minerals through their regular channels. Although operating far from the violence in the DRC, corporations such as Apple, Motorola and Nokia were heavily condemned for their link to the commission of international crimes as framed by the conflict minerals narrative.

Post-2003, the character of corporate involvement in international crimes in the DRC through supply chains shifted from involvement in the particular crimes committed by these groups, to sustaining the conflict in general. Corporations linked to international crimes via their supply chain typically reacted by denying a link between their corporate activity and the crimes or by denying sourcing from the

DRC. The complexity and opaque nature of the supply chain of artisanally mined natural resources made such an excuse plausible. The perceived links between illegal mineral resource extraction and the proliferation of the conflict, emphasized by the UN Group of Expert reports and various NGOs, led to a plethora of traceability initiatives, soft law and, most significantly, to section 1502 of the UN Dodd-Frank act, in an effort to stop armed groups benefiting from 'conflict minerals', tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold. Directed at the full supply chain of artisanally mined conflict minerals, Dodd-Frank section 1502 has nevertheless not reduced the commission of international crimes and may even have increased conflict. The development of Dodd-Frank 1502 and its effects show how a narrative that works well to build awareness about a conflict zone, such as the conflict minerals narrative, may be insufficient as a basis for effective regulation of corporate activity.

Industrial mining corporations operating on the supply side of the supply chain of industrially mined mineral resources operated in a different environment. Their opportunity structure was very different from corporations that became involved by sourcing artisanally mined minerals. Instead of dealing with what the DRC state declared to be illegally mined natural resources, industrial mining corporations bought concessions from the DRC state. For industrial mining companies, the advance by the AFDL revived their interest in mining in the DRC. This caused some of them to approach the AFDL to (re-)negotiate mining concessions already before they had ousted Mobutu, despite the obvious risks of such deals. They paid Kabila upfront sums of money which helped the AFDL capture Congo's capital. While many sought to start operations immediately after the First Congo War, the Second Congo War prevented any industrial mining. When the Second Congo War ended in 2003, industrial mining corporations again (re)turned to the DRC, looking to become suppliers of industrially mined natural resources.

Industrial mining corporations generally react to condemnations of their business activities by claiming that their business activity is beneficial to the development of the DRC's economy. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, this claim is linked to the broader acceptance, within global business culture, that (industrial) corporate activity contributes to democracy and peace. In that way, this reaction is comparable to the reactions of corporations that were accused of involvement in apartheid. In addition, some corporations reacted to accusations of involvement in international crimes by claiming that the corporation itself is a victim of the violence in the DRC, as Soco did.

Industrial mining corporations seeking to extract oil, copper and diamonds, sustained conflict in the DRC, too. First, there is evidence that oil explorations in the northeast of the country by the UK-based corporation Soco International ignited conflict. Second, corporations that make investments in the DRC have been involved in corruption and payments to the Kabila governments, which has been instrumental for Kabila to tighten his increasingly authoritarian grip on power.

Formal control at the domestic level is weak, non-existent. The DRC's weak state institutions are incapable of preventing illegal mining in Eastern DRC and/or corporate support to rebel groups. In some cases, there may even be reversed control, particularly when president Kabila benefits from the payments of industrial mining companies.

International and extraterritorial (semi-)formal control is relatively large in terms of written regulation and official condemnation of corporate involvement in international crimes in the DRC. Many corporations have been held to formal standards, such as the Dodd-Frank act, or to 'soft law' norms, such as the OECD guidelines. However, this (semi-)formal control has been largely ineffective

with respect to enforcement or actual prevention of corporate involvement in international crimes. Virtually all (semi-)formal control was the result of civil society organizations that unveiled and condemned the roles of corporations in the conflict in the DRC.

Chapter 8: Venturing into the DRC: the case of AngloGold Ashanti

In chapter 8, I explained how and why AngloGold Ashanti (Anglo), through its operation of AGAK, became involved in the crimes committed by the rebel group FNI in the Mongbwalu area. This involvement consisted of financing and providing logistical support to FNI and providing them with local and national legitimization.

Anglo claims the company was coerced into financially and logistically supporting the FNI. However, it was Anglo's decision to start operations in the DRC that had put the company in such a vulnerable position. The opportunity structure in the DRC was such that operating in the DRC and not having to support rebel groups was virtually impossible. The risk assessment that led to this decision concluded that risks were 'manageable'. This risk assessment was the result of consultations with representatives from the DRC government, the FNI and MONUC. These consultations, together with the information provided by the UN and NGOs must have made Anglo aware of the risk of involvement in international crimes. Either the risk of having to pay and accommodate rebel groups was grossly underestimated, or the possibility of having to pay and accommodate the FNI was not considered to be a real problem for the company's operations. In the end the drive to extract Congolese gold seems to have surpassed the risk of becoming involved in international crimes. Accusations against the company, Anglo presumably reasoned, could be countered by the claim that Anglo's business activity would, on balance, contribute to economic development of the DRC.

An analysis of Anglo's other-, and subsequent activities, however, shows that contributing to the development of the DRC was not a prominent corporate goal but rather a way to deal with criticism of its business activities. In other words, it was a neutralization technique intended to limit negative consequences of criticism of the company's involvement. Anglo used this type of reasoning in its corporate narrative, because the belief in economic development as something inherently 'good' and beneficial, has been widespread in both the business society, among governments and among the general public. This is reminiscent of the belief in 'peace through commerce' that was prominent during the years of Apartheid.

The neutralization techniques employed in Anglo's corporate narratives seem to be less an integral part of the motivation of corporations to do business in the DRC and more a way to withstand the negative effects of social and official condemnation. Both deflecting attention (to the positive effects of the corporation's activity) and emphasising the negative effects for the company can be seen as ex post facto neutralization techniques intended to excuse corporate activity that qualified, according to NGOs or the UN, as involvement in the conflict and international crimes in the DRC.

Although the opportunity structure for mining companies was difficult and contained a clear risk of having to pay off armed groups, Anglo's concession promised to be lucrative and the DRC government welcomed Anglo's expertise. The presence of the FNI and their demand for financial and logistical support was part of the opportunity for involvement in international crimes but did not negatively affect Anglo's opportunity structure for business in any substantial way. The company's business-to-business character, together with the capability of producing a counter narrative in which the business was a victim of the violent context, enabled Anglo to limit negative effects of the condemnation of its

involvement in international crimes. Even though Anglo could have retreated from the DRC, the company's inevitable financial and logistical support to the FNI did not make them leave.

Formal and semi-formal control existed only on the supranational level: the home and host states did not exercise control over Anglo's business activities. Anglo's conduct was in violation of the 2003 arms embargo, as well as the OECD guidelines. Although the OECD guidelines were developed as soft law, their authority has provided them with a semi-formal status. These formal and semi-formal controls, however, never led to any consequences. Informal control consisted of a report by Human Rights Watch and attention by other NGOs. Already a member of the Global Compact, Anglo joined a number of voluntary principles such as the EITI and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. In addition, Anglo had formulated business principles that forbid, inter alia, payments such as the payments to the FNI. The informal control in the form of NGO reports and Anglo's self-regulation were clearly ineffective in preventing corporate involvement in international crimes in the DRC by financing a rebel group.

Part IV: Conclusion

Chapter 9: Conclusion and discussion

The aim of this study was to find an answer to the following question: *How have corporations become involved in international crimes and how can their involvement be explained and understood?* I investigated corporate involvement in Nazi Germany (1933-1945), Apartheid South Africa (1948-1994) and the DRC (1996-2016).

In the descriptions of corporate involvement in international crimes in Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa and the DRC, I detailed *how* corporations became involved. Broadly, corporate involvement in international crimes took the forms of 1) involvement in the social and economic persecution or marginalization of victims of international crimes, 2) involvement in the violent acts of which the international crimes consisted; and 3) sustaining the regime or armed groups that committed the international crimes. In each of these three broad forms of involvement, the ways in which corporations became involved varied between contexts and between corporations. Corporations were involved in persecution and marginalization of victims of international crimes by carrying out state policies and exploiting labour. Involvement in the violent acts that constitute international crimes included providing deadly substances, delivering vehicles, arms and technology and by sourcing natural resources, providing financial support and providing logistical support. Finally, involvement in sustaining a regime or a conflict consisted of using slave labour, providing oil and financial services, financially supporting armed groups and engaging in corrupt business deals.

Between the corporations studied in this book, the motivation, opportunity and control differed greatly. Leaving aside this diversity of contexts and corporations the following conclusion provides a general answer to the question *why* corporations became involved in Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa and the DRC.

It can be concluded that corporations became involved in international crimes when the context and the opportunity structure for business made such involvement (seem) profitable or, alternatively, enabled a company to limit losses in a context of oppression, war and conflict. The opportunity structures in which corporations became involved in international crimes produced business

opportunities that led to involvement in those crimes while alternative courses of action were limited or made less attractive. Corporations that became involved in international crimes were able to fulfil demands by the perpetrators of international crimes and provide what these perpetrators needed. When moral, social or (semi-)legal condemnation or their involvement became apparent, corporations employed neutralization techniques. These neutralization techniques were drawn from societally accepted sets of ideas, that is, so-called 'sources of neutralization techniques'. These sources of neutralization techniques included ideology and prominent ideas about doing business. The neutralization techniques from these sources were reproduced and shared within corporate cultures and to make those working on behalf of the corporation perceive their activities as appropriate and desirable. Selectively, neutralization techniques were used in corporate narratives, in reaction to social and (semi-)legal condemnation of their activities. Such condemnation of corporate involvement in international crimes has increased significantly since the 1930s because of the efforts of NGOs, journalists and academics that promote corporate respect for human rights. Nevertheless, corporate involvement in international crimes proved very difficult to control, formally and informally, because of the complexity of the phenomenon and because economic and political interests of states gained precedence over moral considerations and victims of gross human rights violations.

I have extended the theoretical model to understand and explain corporate involvement in international crimes by showing how neutralization techniques originate from sources of neutralization techniques and are used in a process of neutralization. In addition, I have extended the theoretical model by showing how control, in cases of corporate involvement in international crimes, can be reversed. Control by strong states that commit international crimes tends to promote corporate cooperation towards international crimes instead of preventing or ending corporate involvement in international crimes.

A central theme in the findings of this investigation, including the extensions of the theoretical model, is the relative normality that surrounds corporate involvement in international crimes. Corporations, in general, became involved through relatively regular business activities motivated by relatively ordinary corporate goals. The outcomes of their business activities, that is, their involvement in international crimes, however, was not normal, regular or ordinary at all. In fact, corporate involvement in international crimes clashed with moral, social or legal norms, at least eventually. My research laid bare how, within corporate cultures and in corporate narratives, normality can be maintained through processes of neutralization. In the dynamic process of neutralization, which develops over time, neutralization techniques are drawn from societally shared ideologies and dominant ideas about business. These dominant ideas about business emphasize the inherent virtues of technological and economic development. Neutralization techniques are used to maintain a sense of normality about morally reprehensible outcomes of business activities and in the face of (expected) social and legal condemnation. Informal control of corporate involvement in international crimes as well as formal forms of control have increased in the last decades. Nevertheless, the normality of corporate activity that leads to such involvement remains insufficiently challenged. At least in part, the sense of normality prevails because corporations have the capacity to withstand and prevent the negative consequences of informal and (the threat of) formal control.

The findings of my study reflect the notion that corporate activity that leads to involvement in international crimes takes place in a 'culture of normality' that characterizes both corporate crime and international crimes (Brants, 2007). Rather than a demonstration of deviant, rogue business behavior, corporate involvement in international crimes, to a large extent, is 'business as usual' (Huisman, 2010).

In order to better understand corporate involvement in international crimes, therefore, the 'normality' of corporate involvement in international crimes should be better understood. Hopefully the findings of the current investigation and the theoretical extensions it has developed can benefit future research. Future research should investigate the mechanisms that cause the relative normality of corporate involvement in international crimes. In addition, future research should investigate the measures that could counter the relative normality of corporate involvement in international crimes.

This investigation shows that, in order to understand more about mechanisms that cause the relative normality of corporate involvement in international crimes, it pays to look at the process of neutralization as traceable in corporate culture and corporate narratives. Central to this process of neutralization are the sources of neutralization techniques, from which neutralization techniques are drawn. In particular, the current context of neo-liberalism as a societally shared idea deserves attention. In what some have described as a cult or a religion shared among the global ruling elites, neo-liberalism entails a 'faith' in the beneficial effects of growth and society and legitimizes corporate conduct by presenting it as inevitable and part of a larger development project. Corporate involvement in international crimes then becomes an externality, accidental and unintentional, even when it is a foreseeable or even inevitable result of a corporate activity. Future research of corporate involvement in international crimes (or human rights violations) should investigate the power of such societally shared ideas and their explanatory value. For contemporary cases of corporate involvement in international crimes, the normative framework that follows from our current, neo-liberal and globalized capitalistic system may be inherently criminogenic.